Abstract. An emerging research program on diffusion across regional international organizations (RIOs) proposes that decisions taken in one RIO affect decision-making in other RIOs. This work has provided a welcome corrective to endogenously-focused accounts of RIOs. Nevertheless, by focusing on the final design of policies and institutional arrangements, it has been conceptually overly narrow. This has led to a truncated understanding of diffusion's impact and to an unjustified view of convergence as its primary outcome. Drawing on public policy and sociological research, we offer a conceptual framework that seeks to remedy these weaknesses by disaggregating the decision-making process on the 'receiving' side. We suggest that policies and institutional arrangements in RIOs result from three decision-making stages: problematization (identification of something as a political problem), framing (categorization of the problem and possible solutions), and scripting (design of final solutions). Diffusion can affect any combination of these stages. Consequently, its effects are more varied and potentially extensive than is currently recognized, and convergence and persistent variation in scripting are both possible outcomes. We illustrate our framework by re-evaluating research on dispute settlement institutions in the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. We conclude by discussing its theoretical implications and the conditions that likely promote diffusion.
Introduction
A growing literature on diffusion in political science, sociology, economics, and law argues that rules, organizational norms, and models developed in one political setting shape organizational decision-making in other settings. This theoretical perspective underpins an emerging research program on diffusion across regional international organizations (RIOs). Scholars suggest that RIOs are not atomistic entities whose emergence and evolution can be understood in isolation from other RIOs. Instead, underlying decision-making processes are interdependent because of material, social, and cultural connections between RIOs. 1 Many of these new studies have shown convincingly that diffusion matters for understanding a wide range of empirical phenomena in RIOs. In so doing, they provide a welcome corrective to the tendency in the existing literature to view RIOs as driven solely by endogenous -functionalist, intergovernmental, cultural, and other -factors.
Nevertheless, this research program has yet to realize its full potential due to a major conceptual limitation. There is a widespread tendency to think of diffusion as affecting only the final design of policies or institutional arrangements in RIOs. This has resulted in a truncated understanding of the possible impact of diffusion across RIOs, and has promoted an unjustified view of convergence, understood as a tendency towards increasing similarity in final designs, as its primary outcome. 2 This narrow focus in much of the literature is surprising for at least two reasons. First, it is widely recognized that organizational decision-making processes, which are conceptualized as interdependent in RIO diffusion studies, are not singular events but tend to consist of several phases or stages. 3 Second, many studies recognize empirically that adaptation of foreign models is a frequent outcome of diffusion; full convergence is actually rather rare. 4 In this article, we respond to Etel Solingen's call to develop conceptual tools that 'enable adequate discrimination among different degrees of diffusion' by moving the conceptual focus towards the decision-making process in the receiving organizations.
We draw on the public policy literature and organizational sociology research to identify three conceptually distinct and sequential decision-making stages and leverage them to understand the creation of RIO policies and institutions: problematization, that is, the identification of something as a political problem; framing, or the categorization of the problem and possible solutions; and scripting, that is, the design of final solutions. We contend that diffusion can affect any combination of these stages. It follows that its effects are more varied than currently acknowledged. Convergence in final design is just one possible outcome; diffusion might also matter when we observe persistent variation in final design.
We illustrate the usefulness of our framework in an empirical realm that has received much recent scholarly attention: the creation of dispute settlement institutions -that is, institutions endowed with the competence to adjudicate disputes and ensure the enforcement of legal commitments. We turn to three RIOs: the European Economic Community (EEC), NAFTA, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Our analysis suggests that diffusion influenced the framing stage in the European Court of Justice, and both the problematization and framing stages in NAFTA. In the case of SADC, diffusion affected all three stages -with the EU providing the scripts for the final stage, as already argued by Alter, Lenz and Osiemo. 5 Convergence in outcome thus can only be seen in the SADC case (with its adoption of the EU model), but this does not mean that diffusion did not matter in the other cases. On the contrary, in those cases diffusion affected earlier stages of decision-making and helped set the context for persistent variation in design later on.
Our conceptual approach has three important broader theoretical implications.
First, it suggests that diffusion, beyond being a force for convergence in final designs, is also a force for institutional or policy change more broadly. Especially if diffusion triggers the recognition of a situation as a problem that requires political action (problematization) and the way in which the problem is understood (framing), it provides a strong impetus for departing from the status quo. Diffusion accounts, then, challenge not only functional theories of institutional design and public policymaking, but also variants of neo-institutionalist theories that predict organizational stability. least in the prominent localization debate. By replacing a narrow focus on ultimate outcomes with a disaggregated view of the decision-making process in the receiving organization, we come to appreciate that diffusion and domestic politics can interact in sequential fashion and, together, affect final outcomes in RIOs.
The article proceeds in four parts. We begin with a brief overview of existing research on diffusion among RIOs and outline its limitations. In Part II, we propose our conceptual framework. In Part III we illustrate it empirically through a structured comparison of the initial creation of dispute settlement institutions of the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. Finally, we discuss the theoretical implications of our framework, and propose two general conditions that seem to promote diffusion in the three stages of decision-making. 
I. Diffusion studies of regional international organizations: Research program and limitations

II. Diffusion and stages of decision-making: A conceptual framework
Our framework starts from a conceptualization of diffusion that has become widely accepted in contemporary research: it is best seen as a process, not an outcome, characterized by interdependent and decentralized decision-making across units of analysis, be they states or international organizations. 21 Whereas recent work on diffusion has focused on dissecting the transfer process from one political setting to another with a focus on final designs, 22 we propose to disaggregate the decision-making process in the receiving organization. We thus view the potential impact of diffusion as more extensive than is depicted in current research. Our specific focus is on diffusion across legally distinct RIOs, be they in different geographical areas or overlapping ones, and in place at the same point or different points in time.
We propose that organizational decision-making encompasses three analytically Diffusion across RIOs, then, can affect any one of these decision-making stages independently and in any combination, including the possibility that it does not affect any of them at all (for example when policymakers in one RIO are unaware of, or simply ignore or reject, the problems, frames, and scripts adopted in other RIOs). Diffusion can thus not only affect scripting, as much recent diffusion research suggests, but also problematization and framing.
We depict our conceptual framework in Figure 1 . and even decades without attempts to change the situation. From this perspective, problematization is the 'process by which given social conditions or arrangements come to be recognized as social problems' 29 , that is, problems that require political action. It is the first step toward the creation of new policies and institutional arrangements.
How does something become a problem? Scholars of organizations at times point to causal variables that are internal to an organization. Social constructivists posit that actors subscribe to particular normative viewpoints about the world that they use to problematize challenges, dysfunctions, strains, or sub-optimal outcomes that may emerge from within the organization. 30 Moreover, the resources, expertise, and 'institutional logics' an organization is endowed with bias what types of occurrences are characterized as problems. 31 Regarding dispute settlement, problematization might result from an endogenous learning process whereby actors become dissatisfied with current arrangements. For example, in Mercosur the 'reform of the DSS [dispute settlement system] was placed on the agenda as a result of perceived problems with the institutional status quo' due to defeats of the two larger member states Argentina and Brazil in dispute settlement. 32 The sources of problematization, however, can also be external to the organization. 'problems' can travel between organizations. 34 Similarly, students of organizations contend that organizations are embedded in organizational fields, and that interaction density, structure, and degree of consolidation generate pressures for institutional isomorphism. 35 In this vein, we suggest that the recognition in one RIO of a problem as politically relevant can be the result of its construction in another RIO. Regional dispute settlement serves in this regard as a very pertinent example. During the 1960s and 1970s few regional integration projects entailed strong dispute settlement mechanisms because no link had been established between dispute settlement and the success of regional integration. As this changed due to the EU experience in the 1970s, the absence of supranational dispute settlement systems in other RIOs began to be seen as a problem. 36
When policy-makers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, started discussion on the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in the early 1990s, experts quickly pointed to the EU and other RIO's experience in arguing that this undertaking is likely to fail in the absence of more solid institutions to ensure implementation 37 -an argument that eventually convinced policy-makers. The problem of dispute settlement had diffused to ASEAN from the outside.
Framing
Once actors come to agree that a problem requires political action, they start thinking about ways of tackling it. As they do, they operate with certain 'frames' in mind. 38 According to research on organizational action, social movements, and policy learning 39 By allowing actors to understand problems and to conceive of certain solutions, frames logically exclude alternative interpretations and solutions. We may say that they channel actors' cognitive abilities and efforts.
Categorization involves the assignment of labels to a perceived problem. A perceived violation of a supranational legal commitment, for instance, may be described as a 'failure of implementation' that has the potential to seriously undermine the credibility of regional integration more broadly. Such categorization allows actors to make sense of a problem -to give it essential traits and characteristics -and thus to render it amenable to certain kinds of solutions and not others. 50 And as we elaborate further below, even when specific templates are adopted, they are usually adapted to local conditions. As already noted, this is the stage of the decision making process upon which scholars of diffusion across RIOs have thus far focused almost exclusively.
The key question for us concerns the origins of those scripts. How do RIO actors produce them? Research suggests that RIO actors refer to the broader environment for inspiration. National governments, with their legal systems and extensive administrative structures, are significant producers and depositories of scripts on a large variety of topics. 51 These are accessible and, depending on the issues on hand, RIO policymakers certainly consult them for insights. Much of the same can be said of the policy platforms on national political parties. Some domestic pressure groups make it their mission to provide ready-made policies for international organizations to adopt.
They promote their work by publishing them on their websites or other media venues. 47 Ibid., p. 643. 48 Importantly, we should note that such diffusion of scripts can happen independently from that of frames or problems. As with frames, scripts may or may not come from the same sources that provided the problematization of something. They may also not come from the source of the relevant frames being utilized. Indeed, because they are rather concrete and explicitly articulated, scripts can be easily 'found' anywhere in world society and borrowed, irrespective of the prior work that has been done on a problem. 
Diffusion and Persistent Variation
As already noted, much of the existing literature shares an implicit understanding of diffusion as the transfer of models across RIOs, even if they are synthesized in creative ways. As a result, scholarship to date has inextricably linked diffusion with convergence, or even homogenization, understood as a tendency of 'receiving' RIOs to become more similar to, or even alike, 'sending' RIOs in final designs. 55 Yet, if diffusion affects only problematization and/or framing while innovation occurs in scripting, scriptural convergence does not take place; sending and receiving RIOs continue to display variation in this respect. Given the existing literature's focus on final designs, we refer to convergence only if diffusion affects the scripting stage, whereas we speak of persistent variation between sending and receiving RIO when diffusion effects are confined to problematization and/or framing. Our main argument is, therefore, that diffusion may be happening even when we observe persistent variation. As mentioned before, while scholars do recognize this empirically, we provide a coherent framework to ground these observations conceptually. We now have a more nuanced conceptual perspective on how diffusion can operate across RIOs, which allows us to improve upon the tendency to equate diffusion with convergence in final designs.
III. Illustrations: Dispute settlement institutions in RIOs
In this section, we illustrate our conceptual framework with a structured comparison of the creation of regional dispute settlement institutions in three RIOs: the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. Based on existing secondary literature and our own research, we re-examine the decision-making episodes that led to the initial creation of such a body in the respective organizations with a view to discerning the role of diffusion at each stage. 56 We are interested in diffusion between RIOs, understood as transfers between distinct legal entities established by formal contracts between neighbouring countries.
We selected these case studies for several reasons. First, we wanted to illustrate the two central conceptual points in our argument: diffusion can generate a variety of effects along the decision-making process, operating not only at the final design (scripting) but also at the problematization and framing stages; and diffusion might play a role in decision-making even if convergence in final designs is not the outcome, which means that persistent variation is another potential outcome of diffusion processes. The three RIOs offer compelling evidence on these points. Second, the three case studies reflect distinct periods in the evolution of the international judiciary -the EEC in the post-World War Two era, NAFTA during the transition period at the end of the Cold War, and SADC in the post-Cold War era. This highlights the broad applicability of our framework.
Third, two of our case studies (the EEC and NAFTA) illustrate especially well how persistent variation can result even in circumstances where there would be strong reasons to expect diffusion in all three stages. As we shall see, there was within each region (Western Europe and North American) a preexisting -though legally distinct -RIO which could have served as a convenient basis for the design of dispute resolution mechanisms. As path dependence and simple logic would lead us to expect, there certainly was some diffusion from those earlier RIOs -a high degree of co-membership, in our view, is certainly a condition conducive to diffusion, an issue we will come back to in the conclusion. But the fact that diffusion did not happen in all stages, and variation in final designs occurred in these two RIOs, is remarkable and instructive.
Our focus is on RIO-to-RIO diffusion. This means we do not examine in detail other sources of diffusion such as global organizations as well as potential second-or thirdorder diffusion effects that are 'the product of sedimentation of prior and historically more remote diffusion.' 57 We of course acknowledge those sources as important. The fact that dispute settlement mechanisms have become very common in international organizations 58 has certainly influenced policymakers in many RIOs. We recognize this but then aim to trace, to the best possible extent, diffusion across RIOs. Our findings, in brief, are these. In all three instances diffusion mattered. Yet, it did so very differently in each case. Existing research argues that the scripts that define SADC's dispute settlement institutions came from the EU. 59 We concur with this view:
the permanent and centralized dispute adjudication of the EU indeed found its way into SADC. Scholars have instead considered NAFTA (with its non-permanent and decentralized mechanism) and the EU itself as innovators: they built new mechanisms.
As such, scholars have shown little interest in diffusion as a possible causal factor. In fact, we suggest that diffusion influenced the framing of potential solutions in the case of the European Court of Justice, and that it affected both the problematization and framing of dispute settlement in NAFTA. Indeed, in both cases, the 'originating' RIOs were in those two very regions respectively -but have been overlooked because of the assumption that lack of convergence means lack of diffusion. When it comes to SADC, moreover, diffusion certainly influenced scripts but also the steps of problematization and framing -something that has until now been overlooked. We summarize our discussion in Table 1 . where we would have expected it to be wholesale (since these two RIOs were created in areas where earlier, though legally distinct, RIOs were in place).
EU
European Economic Community
The EEC, and later the European Union, is typically considered the source of diffusion for other RIOs and rarely the receiver. This is especially so in the case of its European served as grounds for the problematization of the need for a possible court. In the language of this article, the first step of the process was therefore an internal matter: it had to do with the institutional logic of creating three RIOs.
There followed considerable debate over how best to proceed. Negotiators began categorizing the problem they faced and identifying a set of possible solutions -they began framing the issues on hand. The available evidence suggests that at this moment the ECSC-CJ became an important reference point (much as it had in the earlier discussions surrounding the European Political Community). 67 Officials from all the member states but France reasoned that the EEC by virtue of its extensive legal framework would inevitably face a judicial problem similar to the one experienced by the European Coal and Steel Community, and that accordingly an independent permanent court analogous in general terms to the ECSC-CJ would be the appropriate 64 Arbitrage made up of a secretariat and ad hoc technical experts could suffice, given that only a few disputes would arise. 70 The ECSC-CJ, for the French, was not an appropriate reference. The lack of consensus around solutions meant that the court was eventually removed from the agenda in late 1956, only to reappear at later rounds in the negotiations. 71 After securing important economic concessions, the French relented and the idea of a permanent court of justice was accepted. 72 The time had thus come to define its design -the script phase began. Here, if the ECSC-CJ was inspirational in the framing phase, it played a significantly lesser role in this third step. Now officials had to deal with three RIOs and the objectives and aspirations in question had considerably expanded. 73 A more powerful court, effectively dealing with constitutional tasks -i.e., with the ability 'to invalidate statutes and other acts of public authority found to be in conflict with a constitution' 74 -was envisioned, and officials had to reach for new ideas and tools. As a group, key historical accounts, such as Boerger-De Smet's, 75 depict the jurists charged with defining the court as operating with considerable freedom and independence and turned, at least for some inspiration, the national models (the Italian and German especially). 76 The most important innovation was endowing the new European Court of Justice with the power to hear preliminary references from national courts concerning the validity of domestic law and, with that, the unprecedented ability to interpret European law and issue preliminary rulings. 77 This could in principle ensure uniform understanding throughout the Community 78 and would eventually have major implications for the activities of the court. The European Court of Justice was also given powers to review the legality of acts by the Council and the Commission. Article 4, in turn, strengthened the standing of the court by stating that it should be considered equal to the other major institutions of the Community. 79 All this set the new European Court of Justice quite apart from the ECSC-CJ. A new sort of Community court had been created -one that would influence dispute settlement institutions in many other RIOs in the coming decades.
North American Free Trade Agreement
We consider here the highly used dispute settlement mechanism 80 for foreign investments laid out in Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Rather than a permanent court or other institutionalized body, Chapter 11 specifies guidelines for hoc tribunals capable of issuing binding decisions related to discrimination, uncompensated expropriation, and treatment inconsistent with international law by member states vis-à-vis foreign investors. In terms of scripts, Chapter 11 owed little to any other RIO and was 'revolutionary' or at the very least quite innovative in several respects. 81 Yet, other RIOs certainly influenced the earlier stages of the process. As with the European Court of Justice, then, this case highlights how diffusion across RIOs can happen in the earlier phases of institutional design but be far less relevant in the final step, even in cases where the new RIOs supersede preexisting ones in the same spaces (and with the same membership).
What, then, prompted the problematization of investor rights among the NAFTA negotiators? Several factors played a role. Some were certainly endogenous to the region. North America as a whole during the 1980s had become a major destination of foreign direct investment, with flows among the three member states increasing in every direction (except for Canadian investments into Mexico). 82 The United States was accordingly interested in more secure access to Mexico.
But exogenous factors also played a role. Some of these were not RIOs. The United States was already a participant in numerous bilateral investment treaties, 83 and these as a rule had for a long time guaranteed various sorts of investor protections. 84 During the GATT Uruguay Round of 1986, in turn, the regulation of foreign investment disputes was entertained for the first time. 85 86 Indeed, 'the shift in the global economy toward gigantic regional economic blocks, such as the creation of a common market in Europe, left Mexico with few choices. … Remaining closed was not an option, and unilateral liberalization seemed to have few benefits'. 87 The choice was therefore 'negotiated liberalization' in North America. Broadly speaking, then, the European experience mattered. In more specific terms, the presence of two RIOs with dispute settlement institutions -more importantly the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) with its investor protection clauses 88 and, probably to some extent, the 1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, with its binding arbitration tribunal -virtually ensured that the topic would be an issue at least for debate in the NAFTA context. 89 CUSFTA in particular influenced the framing phase. It offered one way of categorizing the problem (the liberalization of capital movement cannot occur if investors worry about the safety of their international investments) and offered a possible solution (investor rights should be therefore protected thought not if it means loss of national sovereignty). Hence 'Canada wanted to keep Chapter 11 as close to CUSFTA provisions as possible. Early bracketed texts were dominated by Canadian exceptions and limiting clarifications'. 90 CUFSTA had also granted governments the right to review certain types of foreign investments -something also of importance to Canada. 91 With CUFSTA's basic approach already shaping NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanism for anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases, 92 its potential applicability to investments was clear.
At the same time, the US was 'interested in expanding even beyond the measures included in its maximalist bilateral agreements, and insisted from the beginning on starting from scratch, rather than building on CUSFTA. The United States was hoping to avoid such a provision in NAFTA'. 93 When it came to scripts, however, NAFTA planners departed significantly from the existing design of any RIO. As Olestrom put it, 'the dispute settlement provisions for investors form one section of the NAFTA that is not modeled on previous trade agreements'. 94 The key characteristic of the dispute settlement mechanism on investments was something unprecedented for an RIO: it allowed investors to sue directly a country or sub-national jurisdiction. All past multinational trade agreements required investors to ask their states to sue on their behalf. 95 This was the outcome the United States wanted given its fear of autocratic Mexican governmental actions over foreign investments -one that predictably caused considerable uproar over time among legal scholars and the public alike. In this regard, if there was diffusion, it was from bilateral investment treaties, which typically allowed for investor-state disputes. 96 A second novel feature of NAFTA was the adoption of a 'negative list' of industries that would be exempt from the stated protection obligations (whereas past practice in CUSFTA and other RIOs required the listing of industries that were covered by those obligations) 97 . A third and major innovation was the wide interpretation of investments as including 'minority interests, portfolio investment, and real estate property'. 98 The final design of NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanism in the investment area was thus remarkably innovative and standard-setting (Mercosur's 1994 Protocol of Colonia, for instance, would subscribe to the investor-state dispute concept). But these novelties do not mean that diffusion from other RIOs did not happen in the problematization and framing phases. There, the experiences of the EU and CUSFTA especially proved important.
Southern African Development Community
The Treaty of Windhoek transformed the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference into today's SADC with the goal of integrating the members' economies into an EU-type common market. Previously, it was a loosely structured organization built upon financial and technical support by international donors aimed at withstanding South Africa's apartheid destabilization policies vis-à-vis its neighbours through functional cooperation in selected policy areas. There was nothing 'natural' about the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism in the transformed SADC.
How did dispute settlement become problematized? Discussions on transforming the organization started in the region in the late 1980s. At this time, political debates initially problematized a variety of issues associated with the functioning of sectoral cooperation, and less so the institutional framework of the organization per se. For example, a virulent issue in the late 1980s was the selection criteria and approval procedure of projects that underwent changes due to the lack of coordination between regional and national political priorities. 99 In none of these debates was dispute settlement ever an issue, suggesting that there were no direct internal reasons for problematization. In fact, an expert team that had been tasked to make recommendations on a revised institutional structure for the organization in light of the envisaged transformation in its mandate noted that SADC's institutions 'are adequate and effective generally.' It presented a list of institutions to be officially included in a new Treaty, which did not contain a dispute settlement mechanism. 100 Instead, problematization diffused from the outside. Even though the aforementioned expert group did mention that 'settlement of disputes shall be by arbitration' 101 , dispute settlement only rose to the agenda as a problem that required political action with the 1992 Consultative Conference, an annual meeting of SADC officials and representatives from external donors, which is widely seen as 'the most important event in the SADC's calendar of activities'. 102 The theme document, which is used by donors to make financial pledges for the following period, engaged, for the first time, justifications for different approaches to economic integration in the region.
Elaborated in cooperation with the most important donor agencies, including representatives from the EU, it clearly stated that a regional development community 'requires mechanisms of mediation and arbitration'. 103 The next Council of Ministers meeting then set the issue onto the political agenda. 104 Nothing in the SADC context per se can explain this problematization. Instead, the documents for the 1992 conference suggest that problematization diffused from another RIO: the idea that economic integration requires mechanisms for dispute settlement came from the European experience, and was transferred by European experts who participated in the formulation of the theme document.
In this case, problematization was closely linked to framing. The first expert group initially framed the choice as one between an arbitration tribunal, which was a reform proposal being discussed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the time 105 , and a committee, which was the existing GATT mechanism. 106 Yet after the Secretariat had depicted the move towards economic integration as involving a choice between 'the proposed North American free trade zone or the European Economic Community' 107 , policy-makers started considering a wider range of frames for dispute settlement that also involved the more centralized form of arbitration of a standing court. All of these frames shared two key characteristics. They diffused from other international and regional organizations rather than constituting endogenous creations, and they categorized the problem of arbitration as one of choosing the right institutions with possible solutions requiring delegating competences to an independent body instead of a politically dominated process. At their first meeting after the consultative conference, the organization's Council of Ministers adopted this frame when noting that a regional Tribunal was to be among 'the central intergovernmental organs of the community'. 108 It was eventually codified in the Windhoek Treaty (Art. 16), which provided for the establishment of a permanent Tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction and the power to 'give advisory opinions' over all matters of the treaty and subsidiary instruments. In accounting for the fact that policy-makers eventually chose a more institutionalized solution to the problem of arbitration, Lenz plausibly suggests that this was due to the fact that political leaders were eager to retain credibility with important international cooperation partners amidst rumours to withdraw funding from the organization after the end of the Cold War, among which the EU was the most important. 109 The Tribunal's specific institutional features -its scripts -were to be laid down in a separate protocol, work on which started several years later. By that time, designing the Tribunal based on the template of the new dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization, with which the Windhoek stipulations were fully compatible, appeared like the 'natural' choice for a group of countries that were largely unwilling to cede significant amounts of sovereignty. When signing the protocol in 2002, however, policy-makers showed 'a revealed preference to emulate the ECJ' due to three key institutional features of the Tribunal: a supranational Commission that monitors state compliance, a preliminary rulings mechanism that is a literal copy of Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, and a system of administrative and constitutional review that provides for private access. 110 As before, this choice was readily explicable by a mix of EUoriented epistemic communities that were involved in the Protocol's drafting, as well as an external context characterized by another legitimacy crisis with external donors, on which the organization continued to be highly dependent. 111 In sum, the SADC Tribunal constitutes an instance of extensive diffusion, with all of the three decision-making steps leading to the final outcomes influenced by external models, above all the EU's.
Conclusion: Theoretical implications and conditions of diffusion
In this article, we have sought to refine our understanding of diffusion's causal influence on RIOs. Drawing on insights from public policy research and sociological work on organizations, we offered a conceptual framework that allows scholars to extend their focus beyond the final design (scripts, in our terminology) of policy and institutional outcomes. We suggested that policies and institutional arrangements in RIOs result from three distinct decision-making stages: problematization, framing, and scripting.
Diffusion across RIOs can affect any combination of these three stages. Convergence thus need not be the only marker of diffusion: diffusion can happen also when we observe persistent variation in final design. We illustrated this conceptual logic with a structured comparison of the establishment of dispute settlement institutions in the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. In this section, we discuss three theoretical implications of our analysis and propose two general conditions under which diffusion is likely to affect the three stages of decision-making in RIOs.
As to theoretical implications, the findings suggest, first, a reconsideration of the nature of diffusion as a causal force. Much of the literature, not only on RIOs but beyond, depicts diffusion as a force for convergence in final designs. 112 From this perspective, diffusion accounts are generally seen as posing a theoretical challenge to functional theories of institutional design and public policymaking. Our analysis indicates that this view is overly narrow. Especially of diffusion triggers the recognition of a situation as a problem that requires political action (problematization) and shapes the way in which the problem is understood (framing), it provides a strong impetus for departing from the status quo, independent of the resulting final outcome -thus, it constitutes a force for change. If this argument is correct, diffusion accounts challenge a potentially much larger class of theoretical approaches including, above all, certain variants of neoinstitutionalist theories that predict organizational stability. Historical institutionalism, in particular, has identified powerful forces -sunk costs, adaptive expectations, learning and coordination effects, and resistance by the beneficiaries of the status quo -that reinforce the continuity of institutional arrangements. 113 Similarly, a large sociological literature contends that institutions rest on shared normative routines and commitments that have a tendency to be chronically reproduced. This has led to a widespread assumption, present also among International Relations scholars, that international organizations 'are notoriously resistant to reform or redirection'. 114 Our analysis suggests that diffusion dynamics might undermine the endogenous selfreinforcement dynamics characteristic of path dependent processes. In this sense, diffusion pressures act effectively as an external shock on the receiving organizationand their role is thus consistent with the thinking of some neo-institutionalists who see external shocks as the primary causes of disruption triggering organizational change.
The specific ways in which diffusion does so invites further research.
Second, our framework contributes to the debate among scholars on 'whether or not diffusion implies the adoption of some variant of the original model.' 115 There is a growing view, resisted by some, that even non-adoption might indicate diffusion to the extent that a particular model is considered for adoption, even if it is ultimately rejected. 116 The claim has merit, and the two positions appear contending because they in fact focus on different stages of decision-making: whereas the mainstream viewnon-adoption indicates non-diffusion -recognizes diffusion only in final designs, the other position essentially acknowledges, as do we, that diffusion might operate at earlier stages of decision-making. When a model is considered for adoption and ultimately rejected as a template for final design, it might nevertheless subtly shape the way an existing arrangement is problematized, or it might frame, in a generic fashion, the problem and potential solutions. In this sense, even non-adoption of the institutional template can indicate a causal role for diffusion. The NAFTA case offers an example.
A third theoretical implication concerns the interaction between diffusion pressures and domestic politics in shaping outcomes. Diffusion studies are often set against explanations emphasizing internal factors in general and domestic politics in particular. The common conceptualization of diffusion as concerning final design is at 113 the root of this disagreement. It has led scholars to treat the two sets of factors as theoretical anti-theses: if a decision to adopt a particular policy or institution can be explained as the result of diffusion it cannot be explained by domestic politics and vice versa. Our framework offers an alternative perspective. By distinguishing discrete stages in decision-making processes, we open up analytical space for both diffusion and domestic politics to matter in a sequential fashion. We gave some illustrations of this when introducing our conceptual framework; our three empirical illustrations, more systematically, displayed different sequences of the key 'dynamics of "imitation and innovation" through which transnational models are instantiated in national settings.' 117 We hence recognize conceptually, not just empirically, that diffusion and domestic politics do not constitute anti-theses, and provide one coherent way for conceptualizing their interaction.
This helps to shed new light on the localization debate. Localization scholars recognize diffusion as a salient influence on local processes but highlight processes of translation and adaptation of foreign norms, ideas, and models by local actors.
Convergence, these scholars contend, is hardly ever an outcome under such circumstances, and local actors should enjoy analytical primacy. 118 Our framework suggests that these arguments tend to be based on the misguided dichotomy that an outcome is affected primarily either by domestic politics or by diffusion. These scholars actually recognize that, in our terminology, it need not be final designs but can also be problems or frames that diffuse from abroad. While domestic politics might be the major determinant of scripting, as these scholars contend, diffusion can nevertheless shape problematization or framing -as was the case in the EEC and NAFTA. Thus, this controversy appears overblown if we recognize conceptually that domestic politics and diffusion can affect different stages in decision-making.
We end by reflecting on one final question: Under what conditions is diffusion likely to influence RIO decision-making? The above empirical illustrations, as well as other diffusion research, suggest two general conditions. First, we expect network ties to play an important role. The closer such network ties, the more likely is diffusion going to be. decision-making because relevant information flows are likely to occur. 119 This is what we saw in the EEC and NAFTA cases, where shared membership across two legally distinct RIOs was a powerful facilitator of diffusion. These two cases also suggest that such membership overlap is most likely to affect the framing stage, and maybe also problematization. It appears to leave more room for innovation at the scripting stage.
Another relevant network tie, especially visible in the SADC case, is interaction with a powerful organizational pioneer. The EU is generally seen as the most successful example of regional integration, and it actively supports such processes in other organizations. 120 Close ties with the pioneer appear to increase the likelihood if diffusion across stages of decision-making. Whether this influence lessens as we move from problematization to scripting remains to be analyzed. The absence of such close ties, in turn, might explain why NAFTA appeared less influenced by the EU model of dispute settlement.
While network ties are relational and therefore tend to be actor-oriented, diffusion is also facilitated by broader structural conditions. A second condition, then, is that the total amount of RIOs in which problems, frames, or scripts have diffused affects the likelihood of diffusion to other RIOs. In an analogy to Strang's influential definition of diffusion 121 , we might hypothesize that the prior adoption of a problem, frame, or script in a population alters the probability of adoption of remaining non-adopters. Concerning dispute settlement, we would thus expect that the more RIOs problematize the issue in their organization, the higher the likelihood that other RIOs will follow suit. The same hypotheses can be rendered for frames and scripts. Once a certain threshold level of adopters is reached at each stage, a specific problem, frame, or script assumes a takenfor-granted character, and is therefore likely to diffuse more rapidly. 122 Over time, then, variation in problematization, framing, and scripting within the population is likely to diminish -a hypothesis well known from world polity theory. 123 What our framework adds to this idea is that this structuration process follows a sequential logic that evolves from problematization through framing towards scripting. In other words, we are likely to see structuration tendencies first in problematiztion, then in framing, and finally in scripting.
This sequential macro-hypothesis appears to be consistent with the general evolution of dispute settlement in RIOs and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that is the subject of much recent analysis. The relevant literature indicates that some form of institutionalized dispute settlement in RIOs and PTAs is becoming increasingly common, which implies, in turn, that RIOs and PTAs without any such mechanism have become rare. 124 This suggests that the issue of dispute settlement is problematized almost 'automatically' when such agreements are being negotiated. In other words, variation across RIOs and PTAs appears to have decreased enormously in problematization. Yet increasing similarity goes further. Beyond problematization, most RIOs and PTAs nowadays feature dispute settlement mechanisms that involve independent third parties as adjudicators, implying that dispute settlement is increasingly framed as a problem that requires independent adjudication. Nevertheless, in terms of scripting much variation appears to remain. It is at this stage of decision-making that diffusion is potentially the least widespread, partly because no single uncontested model of how to address dispute settlement design has emerged. Clearly articulating and rigorously testing such hypotheses across stages of decision-making remains a fruitful area for future research.
